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Index Terms—Learning in games, evolutionary games, passiv-
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Abstract—In this paper, we focus on studying the passivity
properties of different versions of replicator dynamics (RD). RD
is an important class of evolutionary dynamics in evolutionary
game theory. Evolutionary dynamics describe how the population
composition changes in response to the fitness levels, resulting in
a closed-loop feedback system. RD is a deterministic monotone
non-linear dynamic that allows incorporation of the distribution
of population types through a fitness function. Here, in this
paper, we use a tools for control theory, in particular, the
passivity theory, to study the stability of the RD when it is in
action with evolutionary games. The passivity theory allows us to
identify class of evolutionary games in which stability with RD is
guaranteed. We show that several variations of the first order RD
satisfy the standard loseless passivity property. In contrary, the
second order RD do not satisfy the standard passivity property,
however, it satisfies a similar dissipativity property known as
negative imaginary property. The negative imaginary property
of the second order RD allows us to identify the class of games
that converge to a stable equilibrium with the second order RD.
I. INTRODUCTION
Population games [1], [2] is a class of games that model
interactions between a large number of agents (named players
in game theory contest), in which each player or agent’s
payoff depends on his own strategy and the distribution of
strategies of other agents. There has been extensive research
in a variety of settings, ranging from societal [3] to biological
[4] to engineered [5].
In population games, and learning in games [6]–[8], one
of the main points is to understand the behavior of the agent
strategies on the long run. In particular, understanding the con-
vergence and divergence of population strategies to a particular
solution concept such as Nash equilibrium. The convergence
or divergence of such strategies will depend on both the game
under consideration as well as the evolutionary dynamics [9],
[10]. Some specific games can exhibit inherent obstacles to
convergence for a cluster of evolutionary dynamics [11].
Replicator dynamics (RD) is one of the most studied game
dynamics in the literature of evolutionary game theory. RD was
introduced as a non-linear first-order differential equations in
[12] to model a single species and given the name of RD in
[13]. The RD has been used extensively in modeling game
dynamics including biological systems in order to predict
the evolutionary behavior without a detailed analysis of such
biological factors as genetic or population size effects [14].
Passivity theory is a very well established sub-class of con-
trol theory, which implies useful properties such as stability,
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and the importance of passivity as tool in nonlinear control of
interconnected systems—unlike Lyapunov stability criteria—
relays on the fact that any set of passive sub-systems in parallel
or feedback configuration forms a passive system. Passivity
is an input-output property of a class of nonlinear physical
systems which can only consume energy. The notion of
passivity originally comes from electric circuits composed of
resistors, capacitors, and inductors. The same definition applies
to analogous mechanical and hydraulic systems. This idea can
be extended to study electric circuits with nonlinear passive
components and magnetic couplings. For a detailed discussion
on passive systems see [2, 3, 4, 5] and the references therein,
which show that passive systems theory received a great deal
of attention in the last few decades. When a passive system is
connected to a strictly passive system in a negative feedback
loop, energy is strictly dissipated as signals propagate around
the loop, and hence the feedback interconnection is stable. In
other words, by ensuring that every subsystem is passive, a
complex structure of subsystems can be built to satisfy certain
properties.
In [15], the relationship between passivity theory and class
of population games and dynamics was established. It was
shown that what is called contractive games can be considered
as passive games where it satisfies similar properties to passive
systems. Similarly, many evolutionary dynamics also satisfy
the passivity property. This implies that the feedback inter-
connections of passive evolutionary dynamics with passive
game exhibit stable behavior. The above connection between
passivity theory and population games and dynamics enables
the opportunity to analyze in a similar way similar classes of
games and evolutionary dynamics, for instance, higher order
games and higher order dynamics.
In the standard population games, the fitness function of the
population strategies is a static function of the population com-
position. However, in higher order population games, depen-
dence can be dynamic, e.g., as a model of path dependencies
[15]. Similarly, in the standard form evolutionary dynamics,
the number of states is equal to the number of population
strategies. However, higher order dynamics is able to introduce
different behaviors [11], [16]–[18]. Also, in [19], the higher
order version of the replicator dynamics can eliminate weakly
dominated strategies, which is not the case in the canonical
replicator dynamics.
In this paper, we focus on studying the passivity property
of several variations of the well know replicator dynamics,
including the higher order replicator dynamics. We show that
the standard replicator dynamics satisfy the lossles passivity
property. Also, the local version of replicator dynamics satisfy
the lossles property. However, the higher order of the replicator
2dynamics do not satisfy the passivity property. Instead, it
satisfy the negative imaginary property, which can be con-
sidered as a counterpart of the passivity theory. The Negative
imaginary theory also have a similar stability conditions to
those in passivity theory.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II presents preliminary material on population games, passivity
and negative imaginary systems. Section III presents the con-
cept of higher order games and dynamics. Section IV presents
the passivity property for different variations of the replicator
dynamics. Section V inderduces the notion of passiviation for
replicator dynamics. Finally, Section VI contains concluding
remarks.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS
This section presents the required preliminaries and no-
tations from input-output operators, game theory, replicator
dynamics and passivity theory.
A. Input-output operators
Dynamical system can be seen as an operator defined on
function spaces. Suppose that L2 denote the Hilbert space of
square integrable functions, which maps R+ to R
n with inner
product 〈·, ·〉 and ‖·‖. Let L2e denote the space of functions
that are square integrable over finite intervals.
L2e =
{
f : R+ → Rn :
∫
∞
0
f(t)T f(t)dt ≤ ∞ ∀ T ∈ R
}
.
(1)
For U,Y ⊂ L2e subsets of functions, an input-output operator
is a mapping S : U→ Y.
B. Passivity theory
Passivity theory is a useful tool to assess the stability of
a feedback interconnection. In brief, if both components of a
feedback interconnection have the passivity property, then the
closed loop interconnection is stable [15], [20], [21]. A game
theoretic context to passivity in games including the definition
of passive games was given in [15].
Define Σ to be a nonlinear dynamical system with the
following state space description:
x˙ = f(x, u), x(0) = x0, (2)
y = g(x, u),
where, u(t) ∈ U ⊂ Rm is the system’s input vector, x0 ∈
M ⊂ Rn, y ∈ Rm is the system’s output vector and x(t) ∈ Rn
is the system’s state vector. Also, assume that for some classes
of functions, U and Y, and for any initial condition inM, there
exists a solution for all u ∈ U resulting in y ∈ Y and x(t) ∈M
all t ≥ 0. Next, we present two definitions for passive system
from both state space and input-output perspectives.
Definition 1: The nonlinear system Σ with state space (2)
is said to be passive if there exists a storage function L :
M→ R+ such that for all x0 ∈M and t ≥ 0,
L(x(t)) ≤ L(x0) +
∫ t
0
u(τ)T y(τ)dτ. (3)
Σ1
Σ2
r u1 y1
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Fig. 1: Negative feedback interconnection.
The input-output definition of passivity property is given as
follows:
Definition 2: The input-output operator S : U → Y is said
to be passive if there exist constant α such that:
〈Su, u〉T ≥ α, ∀ u ∈ U, T ∈ R+, (4)
and input strictly passive if there exist β > 0 and α such that
〈Su, u〉T ≥ α,+β〈u, u〉T∀ u ∈ U, T ∈ R+, (5)
where, 〈f, g〉T =
∫ T
0
f(t)T g(t)dt.
In the case of equality in the inequalities (3) and (4), the
system is said to be lossless.
The stability of the feedback interconnection between pas-
sive systems is a fundamental result in passivity theory (e.g.,
[22]). That is, the negative feedback interconnection between
a passive system Σ1 and strictly passive Σ2, as shown in Fig.
1, is stable feedback interconnection. Also, the closed loop
system from r to y1 is passive.
C. Negative imaginary systems theory
Negative imaginary (NI) systems theory was introduced by
Lanzon and Petersen in [23], [24] for linear time invariant
systems to control systems with flexible structure dynamics.
Several generalization for the the negative imaginary theory
can be found in [25]–[27]. NI systems theory complements
the limitations of passivity theory in linear systems, which
is only applicable for systems with relative degree zero or
one. Recently, nonlinear version of negative imaginary system
theory was developed in [28]. In this section, we recall the
definition of NI and SNI systems as given in [29]. We also
define some notations that will be used in the paper.
Consider the following LTI system,
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t), (6)
y(t) = Cx(t) +Du(t), (7)
where A ∈ Rn×n, B ∈ Rn×m, C ∈ Rm×n, D ∈ Rm×m,
and with the square transfer function matrix G(s) = C(sI −
A)−1B +D. The transfer function matrix G(s) is said to be
strictly proper if G(∞) = D = 0. We will use the notation[
A B
C D
]
to denote the state space realization (6), (7).
The NI system is defined as follows;
Definition 3: [29], [30] A square transfer function matrix
G(s) is NI if the following conditions are satisfied:
1) G(s) has no pole in Re[s] > 0.
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Fig. 2: A negative-imaginary feedback control system. If the
plant transfer function matrix G(s) is NI and the controller
transfer function matrix G¯(s) is SNI, then the positive-
feedback interconnection is internally stable if and only if the
DC gain condition, λmax(G(0)G¯(0)) < 1, is satisfied.
2) For all ω > 0 such that s = jω is not a pole of G(s),
j (G(jω)−G(jω)∗) ≥ 0. (8)
3) If s = jω0 with ω0 > 0 is a pole of G(s), then it is
a simple pole and the residue matrix K = lim
s−→jω0
(s −
jω0)jG(s) is Hermitian and positive semidefinite.
4) If s = 0 is a pole of G(s), then lim
s−→0
skG(s) = 0 for
all k ≥ 3 and lim
s−→0
s2G(s) is Hermitian and positive
semidefinite.
Definition 4: [25] A square transfer function matrix G(s)
is SNI if the following conditions are satisfied:
1) G(s) has no pole in Re[s] ≥ 0.
2) For all ω > 0, j (G(jω)−G(jω)∗) > 0.
Here, we present an NI lemma.
Lemma 1: Let
[
A B
C D
]
defining the system (6)-(7) be a
minimal realization of the transfer function matrix G(s). Then,
G(s) is NI if and only if D = DT and there exist matrices
P = PT ≥ 0, W ∈ Rm×m, and L ∈ Rm×n such that the
following linear matrix inequality (LMI) is satisfied:[
PA+ ATP PB −ATCT
B
T
P − CA −(CB +BTCT )
]
=
[
−L
T
L −L
T
W
−W
T
L −W
T
W
]
≤ 0.
(9)
The positive feedback interconnection between an NI sys-
tem with transfer function matrix G(s) and an SNI system
with transfer function matrix G¯(s) as shown in Fig. 2. Also,
suppose that the transfer function matrix G(s) has a minimal
state space realization
[
A B
C D
]
, and G¯(s) has a minimal
state space realization
[
A¯ B¯
C¯ D¯
]
. Furthermore, it is assumed
that the matrix I−DD¯ is nonsingular. Then the closed system
has a system matrix given by
A˘ =
[
A+BD¯(I −DD¯)−1C BC¯ +BD¯(I −DD¯)−1DC¯
B¯(I −DD¯)−1C A¯+ B¯(I −DD¯)−1DC¯
]
.
(10)
Moreover, the positive feedback interconnection between G(s)
and G¯(s) as shown in Fig. 2 and denoted [G(s), G¯(s)] is said
to be internally stable if the closed-loop system matrix A˘ in
(10) is Hurwitz; e.g., see [31].
A nonlinear definition of NI system is given as follows:
Consider the following general nonlinear system
x˙ = f(x, u) (11)
y = h(x) (12)
where f : Rn×R→ Rn is Lipschitz continuous function and
h : Rn → R is a class C1 function.
Definition 5: The nonlinear system (11), (12) is Negative
Imaginary if there exists a positive storage function V : Rn →
R of a class C1 such that
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ y˙(t)u(t). (13)
Definition 6: The nonlinear system (11), (12) is Negative
Imaginary if there exists a positive storage function V : Rn →
R of a class C1 such that
V (x(t)) ≤ V (x(0)) +
∫ t
0
y(s)T
∫ s
0
u(τ)dτds, (14)
for all t > 0.
Or,
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ y(t)T
∫ t
0
u(τ)dτ. (15)
The main difference between the NI definition given in (5)
and passivity definition is the use of y˙(t) instead of y(t) in
calculating the supplied energy rate.
D. Population games
A game, in general, consist of three basic elements. Number
of players N : are the decision makers in the game context.
Strategies S: are the set of actions that a particular player
will play given a set of conditions and circumstances that will
emerge in the game being played. Payoff P : is the reward
which a player receives from playing at a particular strategy.
In general, game is viewed as a mapping from strategies x ∈
X , where X = {x : Σi∈Sxi = 1}, to Payoff F (x). This
viewpoint can be extended in dynamic setting to a mapping
of strategy trajectories x(·) to payoff trajectories F (·). In other
words, games can be described as a dynamical systems with
states, inputs and outputs.
A single population game has a set of strategies S =
{1, 2, ...,m} and a set of strategy distributions X = {x :
Σi∈Sxi = 1}. Since strategies lie in the simplex, admissi-
ble changes in strategy are restricted to the tangent space
TX = {z ∈ Rm :
∑
i∈s zi = 0}.
Now, define F (x) : S −→ Rm to be the payoff function
that associate each strategy distribution in S with a payoff
vector so that Fi : S −→ R
m is the payoff to strategy i ∈ S.
Also, defineDF (x) to be the Jacobian matrix of F (x). A state
x∗ ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium if each strategy in the support
of x receives the maximum payoff available to the population.
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Fig. 3: Feedback interconnection of a dynamic and a game,
where P is the payoffs and X is the strategies.
E. Evolutionary dynamics
In general game theory setup, the prediction of the game
outcome and its equilibrium analysis depends on what game
players know about it. In such setup, a assumption such as
full rationality of players is always made.
A slightly different approach to study the game behavior,
in particular for games that have repetitive interactions among
a large number of players, is disequilibrium analysis. Here,
players meant to adjust and revise the chose of their strategies
based on the their current strategies as well as the state of the
collective population when a feedback is given. In this setup,
the revision protocol, is used to organize the procedure of how
and when agents change their strategies.
Revision protocol can be considered as a mapping from
payoffs to strategy distributions under a particular conditional
switch rate ρij . A population game F with a revision protocol
ρij creates the mean dynamic, which is given as follows:
x˙i =
∑
j∈S
xjρij − xi
∑
j∈S
ρij . (16)
Throughout the mean dynamic given in (16) and different
revision protocols ρij , one can create different evolutionary
dynamics that maps payoffs to new strategy distribution. Then,
this new strategy distribution is mapped by the game to
generate new vector of payoffs as shown in Fig. 3. This
analogy is similar to the feedback interconnections in control
systems setups.
For instance, the replicator dynamic is generated using
the imitation of success revision protocol, which is given as
follows:
ρij = xj(pj −K), (17)
where K is a constant less than or equal to any pj . By
substituting (17) into the mean dynamic (16), we get the
replicator dynamics equations as follows:
x˙i = xi(pi −
∑
j
xjpj), (18)
where pi is the payoff for using strategy i.
Another representation of the replicator dynamics Equation
(18) is cascaded connection between an integrator and Gibbs
distribution as shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4: Replicator dynamics (18) as a cascaded connection
between integrator and Gibbs distribution.
.
III. HIGHER-ORDER DYNAMICS AND GAMES
As we indicated in the previous section, the standard game
is a static mapping from strategies X to a set of real valued
payoffs P ,
P = F (x),
and the evolutionary dynamic is restricted first order mapping
from payoffs P to strategies X ,
x˙ = V (x, p).
The dynamical view of this feedback loop can be extended
to a mapping of strategy trajectories to payoff trajectories.
This viewpoint allows the introduction of generalized forms
of dynamics and games, such as higher-order dynamics and
games, to generate these trajectories.
Higher-order dynamics can be introduced—independent of
the game—through auxiliary states to the the first order
dynamics [17], [18], which can be interpreted as path depen-
dency. Also, similar higher-dynamics can be obtained by the
direct derivative of the first order dynamics [19]. It has been
shown in [11], [16]–[19] that modification of the standard dy-
namics can exhibit qualitatively different behaviors. One form
of generalized higher-order dynamics obtained by inducing an
auxiliary state z int the dynamics. In this case, a higher-order
dynamics takes the following form:
z˙ = f(z, p) z(0) = z0,
x = g(z, p),
where, for all x(0) in the simplex and for all bounded p(·),
there exists x∗ and p∗ such that if p(t) → p∗, then, x(t) → x∗.
Furthermore, higher-order dynamics can be introduced by
processing the payoff. Here, the processing might include
an integral action, which means taking the payoff history
into the consideration while generating the new strategies.
Also, processing the payoff can be introduced thought a
derivative action or anticipating the payoff trend, i.e., taking
into consideration the future of the payoff or the trend that the
payoff is following [15], [18].
Similarly, static games can be generalized by introducing
internal dynamics into the game. This concept is illustrated in
[15] through dynamically modified payoff function coupled
with the static game. Therefore, we view the higher-order
games as a generalization of standard games by introducing
internal dynamics into the game, i.e., dynamical system map-
ping from strategies X to payoffs P .
5Auxiliary state z can be used to induce dynamics into static
games to generate higher-order games as follows;
z˙ = f(z, x) z(0) = z0,
p = g(z, x),
such that for all x(0) in the simplex, and for all bounded p(·),
there exists x∗ and p∗ such that if x(t) → x∗, there exists
a unique F (x∗) = lim
t→∞
P (t) = p∗. This implies that each
higher-order game converge and associated a stander static
game at the steady state.
Higher-order games can also be viewed as a processing
or filtering the strategies before computing its payoff. For
instance, inducing a low pass filter that fillers out the high
frequency strategies, will transform the game to a dynamical
system that maps strategies X to payoffs P .
Path dependency is another motivation of higher-order mod-
els in games. Here, path dependency means how a particular
set of choices is affected by the choices that has been made
in the past, even if the past circumstances may no longer be
relevant [32].
IV. PASSIVITY ANALYSIS FOR DIFFERENT VARIATIONS OF
THE REPLICATOR DYNAMIC
This section presents the main contribution of the paper.
The definition of stability in this context implies that there
is an evolutionary stable state i.e., rest point, where the
distance between the population distribution and this rest point
decreases along the population trajectories, i.e., the population
converge to this stable state. Therefore, unstable feedback loop
between learning rule and game means that the feedback will
not converge to a rest point.
A. Standard Replicator dynamics
Replicator dynamics are an important class of evolutionary
dynamics that originated from models of natural evolution
[13]. They provide a way to represent selection among a
population of diverse types.
We first show that first order replicator dynamics are indeed
passive dynamics. In particular, replicator dynamics belongs to
special class of passive systems known as lossless systems.
The standard replicator dynamics is given in (18):
Let x∗ be a Nash equilibrium for the replicator dynamics.
Define exi = xi−x
∗
i to be the deviation from the equilibrium.
The following theorem shows that the first order replicator
dynamics from the payoff pi to the error exi belongs to passive
(lossless) systems.
Theorem 1: The replicator dynamics given in (18) are pas-
sive (lossless) mapping from payoffs p the error e.
Proof: Using exi = xi − x
∗
i , the replicator dynamic
equation (18) can be written as follows:
e˙xi = (exi + x
∗
i )(pi −
∑
j
(exj + x
∗
j )pj). (19)
Define the following storage function,
V (ex) = −
∑
i
x∗i ln
exi + x
∗
i
x∗i
. (20)
Note that V (0) = 0, and
V (ex) = −
∑
i
x∗i ln
exi + x
∗
i
x∗i
≥ − ln
∑
i
x∗i
exi + x
∗
i
x∗i
= ln(
∑
i
xi).
However,
∑
i xi = 1. It follows that V (ex) ≥ 0.
Now, the derivative of the storage function is given as
follows:
V˙ (ex) = −
∑
i
x∗i
1
exi + x
∗
i
e˙xi
= −
∑
i
x∗i (pi −
∑
j
(exj + x
∗
j )pj)
= −
∑
i
x∗i pi +
∑
i
x∗i (
∑
j
exjpj +
∑
j
x∗jpj)
= −
∑
i
x∗i pi +
∑
j
exjpj +
∑
j
x∗jpj
=
∑
j
exjpj.
This implies that replicator dynamics are passive (lossless)
system.
To illustrate the passivity propriety of the standard replicator
dynamics, consider the feedback interconnection between the
standard replicator dynamics and the well known rock paper
scissors game. The payoff function is given as follows;
P = Ax, (21)
where
A =

 0 −l ωω 0 −l
−l ω 0

 .
Here, l, ω are positive numbers. Since the rock paper scissors
game is a static game, i.e., there is no dynamics in the mapping
from X to P . In other words, the rock paper scissors game
represents a memoryless system. This game is passive if and
only if XTP ≥ 0. The follwing shows under which conditions
the rock paper scissors game satisfies the passivity property.
Consider a vector XT = (x1, x2, x3). Using (21), it follows
that;
XT P = XTAX
=
(
x1 x2 x3
) 0 −l ωω 0 −l
−l ω 0



x1x2
x3


= (w − l)(x1x2 + x2x3 + x1x3).
Since the vector X is a probability distribution, this implies
that the quantity (x1x2 + x2x3 + x1x3) is a non-negative
quantity. It follows that the sign of XT P only depends on
the sign of (w − l). This implies that the rock paper scissors
game is strictly passive if ω > l, and non-passive if ω < l.
Moreover, in the standard case, i.e., ω = l the game is lossless.
6Fig. 5 demonstrates the three different cases of the feedback
interconnection between the rock paper scissors game (21)
and the standard replicator dynamics (18). The top figure
represents the case where ω > l, i.e., strictly passive game, the
middle figure represents the case where ω = l, i.e., lossless
passive game, and the bottom figure represents the case where
ω < l, i.e., non-passive game.
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Fig. 5: The feedback interconnection between the three differ-
ent scenarios of rock paper scissors game (21) and the standard
replicator dynamics (18) projected into the simplex.
.
B. Distributed Replicator Dynamics
Generally, the stranded Replicator dynamics describes the
dynamics of the deterministic limit of an infinitely large, well-
mixed population, where the spatial effects are not considered.
Here, Well-mixed indicate that there is no particular structure
imposed into the game. In other words, all agents are equally
likely to interact with one another. This can be represented as
a fully connected graph (complete graph) [33].
However, in structured populations (non-well mixed popula-
tions), the individual agents set on the vertices of a graph and
the edges of determine which agents interact with each other
[33]. This scenario is called distributed Replicator dynamics
in [34]. Also, it is called local Replicator dynamics in [35].
The distributed (or local) Replicator dynamics is represented
as follows:
x˙i = xi(pi
∑
j∈Ni
xj −
∑
j∈Ni
xjpj), (22)
meant to models the inference of population dynamics that
involve non-well mixed populations.
In the case where the payoff P = Ax, the stander replicator
dynamics with can be written as follows;
x˙i = xi
(
(Ax)i − x
TAx
)
, (23)
In [36] evolutionary models for infinite and finite popula-
tions: While the population itself is infinite, interactions and
reproduction occurs in random groups of size N . This leads
to a modified payoff matrix in the following form:
Anew = A−
A+AT
N
(24)
Therefore, the local replicator dynamics is given as follows;
x˙i = xi
(
(Anewx)i − x
TAnew x
)
, (25)
The following proposition shows that the local replicator
dynamics is also lossless passive from the error to the payoff.
Proposition 1: The local replicator dynamics defined in
(25) from the error exi to the payoff P = Ax is lossless
passive.
Proof: Using exi = xi − x
∗
i , the replicator dynamic
equation (25) can be written as follows:
e˙xi =(exi + x
∗
i )[(Anew(ex + x
∗))i (26)
− (ex + x
∗)T Anew (ex + x
∗)]. (27)
Define the following storage function,
V (ex) = −
(
N
N − 2
)∑
i
x∗i ln
exi + x
∗
i
x∗i
. (28)
Note that V (0) = 0, and
V (ex) = −
(
N
N − 2
)∑
i
x∗i ln
exi + x
∗
i
x∗i
≥ −
(
N
N − 2
)
ln
∑
i
x∗i
exi + x
∗
i
x∗i
=
(
N
N − 2
)
ln(
∑
i
xi),
However,
∑
i xi = 1. It follows that V (ex) ≥ 0.
Now, the derivative of the storage function is given as
7follows:
V˙ (ex)
= −
(
N
N − 2
)∑
i
x∗i
1
exi + x
∗
i
e˙xi
= −
(
N
N − 2
)∑
i
x∗i [(Anew(ex + x
∗))i
− (ex + x
∗)T Anew (ex + x
∗)]
= −
(
N
N − 2
)
[x∗TAnew(ex + x
∗)
− (ex + x
∗)T Anew (ex + x
∗)]
= −
(
N
N − 2
)
[x∗TAnewex + x
∗TAnewx
∗ − eTxAnewex
− eTx Anew x
∗ − x∗T Anew ex − x
∗TAnewx
∗]
= −
(
N
N − 2
)
[−eTxAnewex − e
T
x Anew x
∗]
=
(
N
N − 2
)
eTxAnew(ex + x
∗)
=
(
N
N − 2
)
eTx
(
A−
A+AT
N
)
x
=
(
N
N − 2
)(
eTxAx−
1
N
(eTxAx+ e
T
xA
Tx)
)
=
(
N
N − 2
)(
eTxAx−
2
N
eTxAx
)
=
(
N
N − 2
)(
1−
2
N
)
eTxAx
= eTxAx
= eTxP
This implies that replicator dynamics are passive (lossless)
system.
C. Second order replicator dynamics
Second order dynamics can be introduced into the evolution-
ary dynamics through several forms [15], [37]. In this section,
we follow the approach in [15], which use an auxiliary state
to introduce the Second order dynamics to derive two versions
of the Second order replicator dynamics.
1) Integral action Second order replicator dynamics: One
form of the second order replicator dynamics can be obtained
by introducing an auxiliary state p̂ in the payoff function. This
results in the following dynamics:
x˙i = xi(p̂i −
∑
j
xj p̂j) (29a)
˙̂pi = pi. (29b)
The equilibrium conditions are p∗i = 0, x
∗
i = σmax(p̂
∗
i ), and
p̂∗i = 1 .
The Equation (29b) can be written as follows;
˙̂pi = pi (30)
p̂i =
∫ t
0
pi(τ)dτ. (31)
It has been shown in [38] that the second order replicator
dynamics is not passive. In particular, it has been shown that
the linearization of the replicator dynamics (29) is reduced to
a double integrator, which is not passive.
The following proposition proves that the second order
replicator defined in (29) is a negative imaginary system
according to the definition given in (6).
Proposition 2: The second order replicator dynamics de-
fined in (29) from the error exi to the payoff P is a negative
imaginary system.
Proof: Using exi = xi − x
∗
i , the replicator dynamic
equation (29) can be written as follows:
e˙xi = (exi + x
∗
i )(p̂i −
∑
j
(exj + x
∗
j )p̂j) (32)
p̂i =
∫ t
0
pi(τ)dτ. (33)
Using the storage function (20), it follows that;
V˙ (ex) = −
∑
i
x∗i
1
exi + x
∗
i
e˙xi
= −
∑
i
x∗i (p̂i −
∑
j
(exj + x
∗
j )p̂j)
= −
∑
i
x∗i p̂i +
∑
i
x∗i (
∑
j
exj p̂j +
∑
j
x∗j p̂j)
= −
∑
i
x∗i p̂i +
∑
j
exj p̂j +
∑
j
x∗j p̂j
=
∑
j
exj p̂j
=
∑
j
exj
∫ t
0
pj(τ)dτ.
This implies that second order replicator dynamic is negative
imaginary.
It is straightforward to show that the linearization of the
replicator dynamics around an equilibrium point, which is
given as
δx˙ = Aδx+ βδp̂
δ ˙̂p = δp,
satisfies the negative imaginary property. Here, A =

−x∗1 −x
∗
1 · · · −x
∗
1
−x∗2 −x
∗
2 · · · −x
∗
2
...
...
...
...
−x∗n −x
∗
n · · · −x
∗
n

, β = I − x∗x∗T and x∗ is any
point in the simplex. The reduced system can be obtained
using the transformation δx = δx∗ +Nδw, δp = δp∗ +Nδq
and δp̂ = Nξ as follows:
δw˙ = NTANδw +NTβNξ
ξ˙ = δq.
8Now, consider the case where n = 3 and x∗i =
1
3
,
[
δw˙
ξ˙
]
=


0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


[
δw
ξ
]
+


0 0
0 0
1 0
0 1

 δq (34a)
δy =
[
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
] [
δw
ξ
]
. (34b)
The system (34) is a double integrator, which is a negative
imaginary system.
Proposition 2 shows that the second order replicator dynam-
ics defined in (29) satisfies the negative imaginary property.
This implies that the feedback interconnection between the
second order replicator dynamics defined in (29) and any
strictly negative imaginary game should lead to a stable
behaviour [30].
For instance, consider the following second order negative
imaginary game;
z˙ = Az +B u
P = Cz +D u, (35)
where,
A =
[
−0.9 0
0 −1.2
]
, B =
[
1 0
0 1
]
,
C =
[
1 0
0 1
]
and D =
[
−3 0
0 −3
]
.
The feedback interconnection between the second order
replicator dynamics (29) and the second order strictly negative
imaginary game (35) is demonstrated in Fig. reffig:RD-g and
Fig. 7.
Figs. 6 and 7 shows the evolution of the states of the
positive feedback interconnection between the strictly negative
imaginary game (35) and second order replicator dynamic
(29).
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Time
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
x1
x2
x3
Fig. 6: The evolution of the states of the strictly negative
imaginary game (35) in feedback loop with the second order
replicator dynamics (29).
.
0
0.50
0.2
0.4
0
0.6
0.8
0.5 1
1
1
Fig. 7: The evolution of the states of the strictly negative
imaginary game (35) in feedback loop with the second order
replicator dynamics (29) projected into the simplex.
.
2) Lead-lag second order replicator dynamics: A more
general second order replicator dynamics can be introduced
using derivative action combined with low pass filter as a
prepossessing to the payoffs before the replicator dynamics
as shown in Fig. 8. The Lead-lag second order replicator
dynamics can be defined using an auxiliary state p̂. The
dynamics is given as follows;
x˙i = xi(yi −
∑
j
xjyj) (36a)
˙̂pi =
−1
β
p̂+ pi (36b)
yi = (
1
β
−
α
β2
)p̂+
α
β
pi. (36c)
Here, α and β are positive constants.
Fig. 8: Passive replicator dynamics.
.
The passivity propriety of second order replicator dynamics
given in (36) depends on the ratio between the constants α and
β. The following preposition discuss the passivity property of
the replicator dynamics given in (36).
9Proposition 3: The second order replicator dynamics given
in (36) is negative imaginary for all positive constant α and
β and passive if and only if α
β
> 1.
Proof: The dynamical part of the second order replicator
dynamic given in (36) can be expressed as a serial connection
between an integrator, 1
s
, and the following transfer function
1 + α s
1 + β s
.
In other words, the dynamical part of second order replicator
dynamic given in (36) in frequency domain is given as follows;
GRD(jω) =
1 + α jω
jω (1 + β jω)
. (37)
The real and imaginary part of the transfer function (37) is
given as follows;
ℜ(GRD) =
β(α/β − 1)
β2ω2 + 1
. (38)
ℑ(GRD) =
−(αβω2 + 1)
β2ω3 + ω
. (39)
It is clear from (38) that the real part of GRD(jω) is positive
if and only if α
β
> 1. Also, (39) shows that the imaginary part
is always negative for all positive α and β.
Fig. 9 demonstrates the feedback interconnection between
the standard rock paper scissors game (21) with w = l,
i.e., lossless game and the second order replicator dynamics
given (36). The top figure in Fig. 9 represents the non-passive
replicator dynamics where α
β
< 1, where the bottom figure
represents the passive replicator dynamics with α
β
> 1 .
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1
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0.8
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0.2
0.4
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1
Fig. 9: The evolution of the states of the strictly negative
imaginary game (35) in feedback loop with the second order
replicator dynamics (29).
.
V. PASSIVATION OF NON-PASSIVE DYNAMICS
This section introduces the notion of passivation thorough
a feedback or forwarded of non-passive dynamics and static
gain. The term passivation in passivity theory means the
process of forcing a non-passive or lossless dynamical system
to behave as a strictly passive system using feedback and/or
foreword interconnection. Similarly,
Fig. 10: Passiviation of lossless or non-passive dynamics
throgh static feedback gain. Here, the static gain is chosen
to passivate the dynamics in the colored green box.
.
In the case of replicator dynamics, any positive gain in
negative feedback interconnection will change the replicator
dynamics for lossless dynamics to strictly passive dynamics
in Fig. 11.
Fig. 11: Passive replicator dynamics.
.
The passive first order replicator dynamics is then given as
follows;
x˙i = xi(T˙i −
∑
j
xj T˙j)
T˙i = Pi −Kixi. (40)
Similarly, as in Proposition 3, we can show that the modified
replicator dynamics (40) a is strictly passive.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, passivity analysis for different versions of
the replicator dynamics was conducted. The standard first
order replicator dynamics is shown to be passive lossless.
This implies that the replicator dynamics will lead to a
stable equilibrium with all strictly passive games. Similarly,
the second order replicator dynamics is shown to satisfy the
negative imaginary property, which implies that the second
order replicator dynamics leads to a stable equilibrium with
all strictly negative imaginary games.
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